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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Anna Richardson Smith *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article summarizes Virginia labor and employment law
cases and statutory activity from the past year. Judicial develop-
ments have been limited and largely unremarkable this year.
Section II describes recent Virginia cases interpreting employ-
ment agreements. Section III considers cases interpreting Virgin-
ia's employment-at-will doctrine. Section IV focuses on cases ana-
lyzing business torts in an employment context. Finally, Section
V provides an overview of legislative activity during the 2008
Virginia General Assembly session. Arguably, the most signifi-
cant practical impact on Virginia employers has been the need to
comply with the long-anticipated increase in the federal mini-
mum wage. Given this significant legislation, this article con-
cludes with a summary of its graduated pay requirements.
II. EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
Virginia circuit courts continued in the past year to grapple
with fact-specific analyses of restrictive covenants. In Virginia,
such covenants are disfavored as restraints of trade.1 A three-
part test is used to assess the validity of a non-compete agree-
ment. First, courts consider whether the restraint imposed by the
agreement is only as great as necessary to protect the legitimate
business interests of the employer. 2 Second, courts consider
* Associate, Kaufman & Canoles, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia. J.D., 2003, Wake Forest
University School of Law; M.A., 1995, University of New Mexico; B.A., 1994, Wake Forest
University. The author expresses sincere thanks to Laurie Claywell, Robert J. Barry, John
M. Bredehoft, and Donna Frangione.
1. Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 581,544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (2001).
2. See Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Investigations Servs., Inc., 270 Va. 246,
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whether the agreement is unduly harsh and oppressive in limit-
ing the employee's legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood.3 Third,
courts consider whether the restraint is consistent with sound
public policy.4 Generally, this test appears in the case law as a
reasonableness analysis of the duration, geographic scope, and
breadth of activity restrained by the agreement. 5
In March of 2008, the Virginia Beach City Circuit Court ana-
lyzed the non-compete provision of an agreement between busi-
ness partners using the reasonableness analysis of an employer-
employee restrictive covenant. 6 In Miran v. Merullo, plaintiff
Wahsei Miran agreed to provide his services to defendants Alan
Merullo and Greg Smith in support of their newly opened martial
arts training facility.7 The parties memorialized their relation-
ship in a September 2004 operating agreement.8 Miran agreed to
allow the defendants to market their facility using the name of
his existing martial arts academy. 9 Miran would teach two mar-
tial arts sessions a month at the facility, as well as provide the
defendants with lessons for their own professional development. 10
In exchange, the two defendants agreed to pay Miran ten percent
of their facility's monthly profit. 11
The operating agreement also contained a non-compete clause
that penalized the defendants if they opened another martial arts
facility that did not include Miran. 12 The financial penalty was
$15,000, and the provision explicitly remained "in effect indefi-
nitely."13 Despite this restraint, the two defendants stopped pay-
ing Miran in March of 2007, at which time they changed the
name of their martial arts facility and declined to continue Mi-
ran's involvement in their venture.1 4 The defendants continued,
249, 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2005).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Simmons, 261 Va. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678.
6. Miran v. Merullo, No. CL07-5878, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 37 (Cir. Ct. Mar. 10, 2008)
(Virginia Beach City).
7. Id. at*1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *1-2.
13. Id. at *2.
14. Id.
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however, to use Miran's name and likeness in their marketing
materials and to use a unique symbol that Miran created solely
for use in his own facility. 15
Miran sued the defendants, seeking a variety of damages as
well as attorneys' fees. 16 The defendants argued in their motion
for partial summary judgment that the restrictive covenant was
not enforceable.17 While recognizing that the restraint's language
did not "fall neatly within the definition for a covenant not to
compete," the court was able to identify the agreement's time-
frame and protected interest.1 8 Specifically, the court noted that
the duration of the restrictive covenant was the "cooperative
business relationship" of the parties.19 The restrained conduct
was the opening of "a similar martial arts school without afford-
ing [the plaintiff] the opportunity to participate."20
Given these parameters, the court found that the agreement
was properly analyzed as a non-compete agreement between an
employer and an employee. 21 In analyzing the agreement, the
court first found the agreement to be reasonable in duration. 22
Although the provision explicitly stated that it was to remain in
effect "indefinitely"-typically fatally overbroad durational lan-
guage23-- the court construed the non-compete clause only to re-
main in effect while the parties maintained a business relation-
ship. 24 The court acknowledged that this involved "splicing . . .
the language of the [non-compete] clause," but taken as a whole,
the wording did not restrain the defendants' conduct once the re-
lationship ended.25
Next, the court found the non-compete clause to be reasonable
in the scope of restrained conduct because it did not "wholly pre-
vent the defendants from pursuing another business venture,"
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Id. at *5.
19. Id. at *4.
20. Id.
21. See id. at*5.
22. See id. at *7.
23. See, e.g., Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 581, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (2001).
24. Miran, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 39, at *7.
25. Id.
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even during their business relationship with Miran. 26 The finan-
cial penalty of $15,000 for pursuing other business without Mi-
ran's involvement did not amount to an injunction against such
conduct. 27
The court's analysis of the geographic scope of the covenant,
like its analysis of the durational scope, was notable for its con-
textual complexity. The court first acknowledged that the cove-
nant contained no geographic limitation on the competition re-
stricted 28--again, a potentially fatal flaw.29 The court then
reviewed the historic development of the geographic scope analy-
sis, noting that the purpose of the geographic scope analysis was
to prevent an employer from harshly restraining an employee's
ability to earn a living once the employment relationship ended.30
The court noted that where the parties are sophisticated and
stand on equal bargaining ground, the disadvantages that usually
prevent employees from protecting their interests in future em-
ployment are absent.31 Further, in the contract at hand, the con-
cerns the court usually would have had as to a restraint on an
employee's future employment were absent because the non-
compete clause did not, on its face, restrain any conduct after the
end of the business relationship. 32
After analyzing these points, the court denied the motion for
partial summary judgment and found the non-compete clause to
be valid.33 The court's analysis of the restraint as a whole agree-
ment, to be understood in the context of the goals and bargaining
power of its parties, demonstrates a broad and relatively flexible
approach to the typical reasonableness inquiry found in covenant
cases.
A more traditional and straightforward application of the Vir-
ginia three-part reasonableness test is found in the Richmond
City Circuit Court's analysis in Pace v. Retirement Plan Adminis-
26. Id. at *9.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *7.
29. See, e.g., Power Distrib., Inc. v. Emergency Power Eng'g, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 54, 57
(E.D. Va. 1983) (applying Virginia law).
30. Miran, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 37, at *7.
31. Id. at *9.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *10.
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trative Service, Ltd.34 The Pace non-compete clause also demon-
strates classic problems in drafting. In Pace, the plaintiff left her
employer to work for a competing business.35 After her employer
advised her that it would seek to enforce her non-compete clause,
she sought a declaratory judgment on the validity of the clause,
taking the position that it was overly broad and therefore
invalid.36
The court cited and emphasized the leading cases that require
narrow drafting of a non-compete clause to protect only the em-
ployer's legitimate business interests. 37 This concept is often dis-
cussed using a "janitor" metaphor-if a non-compete clause is
drafted so broadly that it restricts, for example, a salesperson
from later working in any capacity for a competitor, it likely is
unreasonably broad.38 After all, the employee likely would not
pose a competitive threat if he worked for a competitor as a jani-
tor. The Pace plaintiffs non-compete clause prevented her from
competing with the employer in any business activities within the
agreement's geographic scope or during its time limits. 39 The
court found that this provision was too broad because it did not
limit the restraint on employment to "competition with other
businesses that compete with [the employer's] business."40
The Pace plaintiffs non-compete clause also prevented her
from soliciting "referral sources" in her subsequent employment,
but the clause did not limit the term to only the "referral sources"
of the employer.41 This restriction, in attempting to prevent
plaintiffs post-employment interaction with any referral source,
was too broad to protect the employer's relationships with only its
referral sources. 42
34. 74 Va. Cir. 201 (Cir. Ct. 2007) (Richmond City).
35. Id. at 201.
36. Id. at 201-02.
37. Id. at 203 (citing Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Investigations Servs., Inc.,
270 Va. 246, 249, 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2005); Modern Env'ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 263 Va. 491,
493, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695 (2002)).
38. See, e.g., Cliff Simmons Roofing, Inc. v. Cash, 49 Va. Cir. 156, 157 (Cir. Ct. 1999)
(Rockingham County).
39. Pace, 74 Va. Cir. at 203.
40. Id. at 203-04.
41. Id. at 203.
42. Id.
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In sum, the reasonableness of the restrictions as to geography
and duration could not save the Pace non-compete clause where it
attempted to restrict employment activities beyond the legitimate
business needs of the employer.43 The overbreadth of both the
non-solicit and the non-compete portions of the Pace agreement
demonstrates the primary drafting problem in unenforceable
agreements of this type-lack of attention to definitional narrow-
ness, which sometimes may be connected to the drafter's failure
to communicate to the client the scrutiny for overbreadth that
Virginia courts are likely to give any non-compete clause.
III. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
A key characteristic of Virginia employment law is its compre-
hensive emphasis on employment-at-will. An employer generally
may discharge an employee for any reason, so long as that reason
is not contrary to the commonwealth's established public policy or
a specific statute.44 The "public policy"-based exceptions to this
doctrine arise where an employee is discharged for exercising a
statutorily created right; for a reason against public policy as ex-
plicitly provided by statute; or because of the employee's refusal
to perform an unlawful act. 45 Since the doctrine was first formu-
lated in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,46 cases typically have
focused on whether the statutory right or unlawful act alleged to
undergird the claim is adequate as a matter of law.
Consistent with this trend, in 2007 the Fairfax County Circuit
Court held that an employee's allegation that she was asked by
an employer to act in a way that violated Virginia's obstruction of
justice statute does not constitute a basis for an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.47 Virginia's obstruction of justice
statute prohibits a person from obstructing "any law-enforcement
43. Id. at 205. Without extensive analysis, the court also stated that the non-
compete's blue pencil, assignment, and remedies provisions rendered it unenforceable. Id.
That holding is arguably unsupported by existing Virginia law.
44. See, e.g., Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 189-90, 523 S.E.2d 246, 252 (2000); Mil-
ler v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 467, 362 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1987); Bowman v. State Bank
of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 539-40, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985).
45. See Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 263 Va. 209, 213-14, 559 S.E.2d 709, 711 (2002).
46. See Bowman, 229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
47. Carr v. Bus. Sys. Mgmt., Inc., 73 Va. Cir. 459, 463 (Cir. Ct. 2007) (Fairfax Coun-
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officer in the performance of his duties ... without just cause."48
In Carr, the plaintiff-employee argued that she was terminated
from employment because she refused to violate the statute at
her employer's request.49 Specifically, she alleged that her super-
visor asked her to sign a letter to the supervisor's probation offic-
er falsely asserting that his business address had changed and
then meet with that probation officer to support the content of the
letter.50 Her supervisor's goal, the plaintiff asserted, was to allege
an address in a different county so that he would be assigned a
probation officer who was not as strict. 51 Although she drafted
the letter, she ultimately refused to sign it or to meet with the
probation officer.52
In analyzing the claim, the circuit court acknowledged that any
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine under Bowman and
its progeny is to be narrowly construed and should extend only to
"specifically enumerated public policies."53 The court then pro-
vided two explanations for why the plaintiffs claim could not be
supported by the obstruction of justice statute. First, the court
concluded that a probation officer is not a law enforcement officer;
therefore, the plaintiffs allegation of coerced conduct against a
probation officer could not violate Virginia's obstruction of justice
statute.54 That statute prohibits a person from knowingly ob-
structing any "law enforcement officer" in the performance of his
duties.55 Because neither the Virginia Code nor any case law de-
termined that a probation officer is a "law enforcement officer,"
the court relied on the definition of "law enforcement officer" used
in Virginia's assault and battery statute.56 In that statute, a law
enforcement officer is expressly defined "as an employee of a po-
lice department or sheriffs office, conservation officer, game
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-460(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
49. Carr, 73 Va. Cir. at 459-60.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 460.
53. Id. at 461 (citing Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 263 Va. 209, 213, 559 S.E.2d 709,
711 (2002)).
54. Id. at 461-62.
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-460(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
56. Carr, 73 Va. Cir. at 461-62.
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
warden, jail warden, deputy sheriff, auxiliary police officer, and
auxiliary deputy sheriff."57
After outlining these definitions, the court analyzed whether a
probation officer could be considered a law enforcement officer for
purposes of the obstruction of justice statute. Although the court
found that a probation officer and a law enforcement officer have
many duties in common-such as conducting investigations and
effectuating arrests-the court declined to read the position of
probation officer into the statutory definition of law enforcement
officer.58 Because her allegations could not support an obstruction
of justice claim under the statutory definition (albeit under a dif-
ferent statute), the plaintiffs claim could not survive a demur-
rer. 59
The court went on to note that, historically, an obstruction of
justice claim has not been allowed by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia as a basis for a plaintiffs Bowman claim.60 The Supreme
Court of Virginia has on two occasions declined to allow use of the
obstruction of justice statute as the basis for an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine. 61 The Carr Court relied on both the
specific definitional problem with a "probation officer" and this
second, precedential rationale to sustain the defendant's demur-
rer to Carr's claim. 62 It is perhaps a measure of the fluid nature
of this tort under Virginia law that the Carr Court felt it appro-
priate to resolve the definitional issue as an independent basis for
decision.
IV. BUSINESS TORTS
Virginia employers may resort to a variety of common law and
statutory claims to seek compensation for damages caused by un-
lawful competitive activities undertaken by employees or former
employees. Although these claims often involve the interpretation
of restrictive covenants, employers may also seek relief from the
57. Id. at 461 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
58. Id. at 461-62.
59. Id. at 463.
60. See id. at 462.
61. See Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 263 Va. 209, 215, 559 S.E.2d 709, 712 (2002);
City of Va. Beach v. Harris, 259 Va. 220, 233-34, 523 S.E.2d 239, 245-46 (2000).
62. Carr, 73 Va. Cir. at 463.
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wrongful acts of those employees who were not subject to such co-
venants through the application of various business tort prin-
ciples. These torts include common-law and statutory conspiracy,
tortious interference with actual and prospective business rela-
tions, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets,
and conversion. In Banks v. Mario Industries of Virginia, Inc., the
Supreme Court of Virginia analyzed several recurring problems
faced by those asserting these torts.63
In Banks, the plaintiff, Mario Industries of Virginia, Inc. ("Ma-
rio"), employed defendant Troy Cook as its sales division manag-
er.64 Mario also contracted with defendant Bette Banks to pro-
vide sales services in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of
Columbia.65
Cook later left Mario to set up his own competing business.66
Prior to leaving, he contacted a previous Mario warehouse man-
ager about forming his new business, and enlisted Banks' aid to
gain client referrals. 67 Cook also prepared a document that out-
lined some of his intentions for his business. 68 Cook's document
included confidential information about Mario, such as its yearly
sales totals, target price points for customers, vendor lists, mar-
gins, commissions, and other trade secrets. 69 Cook then re-
signed.70
After Cook's resignation, Mario's computer forensics expert
searched the hard drive of Cook's work computer, which con-
tained deleted e-mails, quotes, and files that related to the forma-
tion of Cook's competing business. 7 1 The expert also found the
document Cook had written prior to his resignation that outlined
his intentions for his business.72 All of these documents had been
printed out from the computer Cook had used while at Mario. 73
63. 274 Va. 438, 447, 650 S.E.2d 687, 692 (2007).
64. Id. at 444, 650 S.E.2d at 690.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 445-46, 650 S.E.2d at 691.
67. Id., 650 S.E.2d at 691-92.
68. Id. at 445, 650 S.E.2d at 691.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 446, 650 S.E.2d at 691.
72. See id.
73. Id.
2008]
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Meanwhile, Banks supported Cook's new venture in a variety
of ways. She sent quotes to Cook's new company instead of send-
ing them to Mario. 74 She diverted several projects from Mario to
Cook before ending her services as an independent contractor
with Mario.75 Not surprisingly, she moved to Cook's company af-
ter being offered a ten percent commission. 76 Mario sued Banks,
Cook, and others involved in the formation of Cook's competing
company based on theories of (1) tortious interference with busi-
ness relations; (2) common-law conspiracy; (3) statutory conspira-
cy; (4) breach of fiduciary duty (against Cook, Banks, and one
other defendant); (5) misappropriation of trade secrets (against
Cook and two other defendants); and (6) conversion (against Cook
and two other defendants).77
In upholding a jury verdict for Mario, the Supreme Court of
Virginia made several rulings relevant to procedural and eviden-
tiary problems typically encountered by parties litigating busi-
ness torts. First, the court affirmed the trial court's instruction to
the jury that if it found an agency relationship between Mario
and Cook, then Cook owed a fiduciary duty to Mario.78 On appeal,
Cook challenged this instruction based on his position that the
determination of whether he owed a fiduciary duty of loyalty to
Mario was a question of law for the court and had been incorrect-
ly submitted to the jury.79 The court clarified that pursuant to
these jury instructions, once an agency relationship is estab-
lished, the agent necessarily owes a fiduciary duty to the princip-
al.80 The existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact
for the jury.81
74. Id., 650 S.E.2d at 692.
75. Id. at 447, 650 S.E.2d at 692.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 452-53, 650 S.E.2d at 695.
79. Id. at 452, 650 S.E.2d at 694-95.
80. Id. at 453, 650 S.E.2d at 695.
81. Id. at 452, 650 S.E.2d at 695. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Agency is a fiduciary relationship between two parties in which one party
agrees to act on behalf of and subject to the control of the other party. In an
agency agreement, the parties agree that the agent shall act on behalf of and
subject to the control of the principal. If a party is not an agent, that party is
not a fiduciary.
Id. at 452-53, 650 S.E.2d at 695.
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The court also examined an interesting question of attorney-
client privilege raised by Cook. A provision in Mario's employee
handbook provided that employees should have no expectation of
privacy on employer computers.8 2 Perhaps unthinkingly, but as
many other employees do, Cook used his office computer for per-
sonal messages-including communications to his lawyer, which
Cook argued were privileged. The court disagreed: even though
the employees were permitted to use the computers for personal
business, any document drafted on the employer's computer
would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege during dis-
covery.83 The court stated that "the [attorney-client] privilege is
waived where the communication takes place under circums-
tances such that persons outside the privilege can overhear what
is said."84 Therefore, an employee who prepares and/or stores
personal documents using his employer's information technology
is effectively sharing the content of the documents with his em-
ployer (as well as waiving applicable privileges, perhaps even in
litigation with persons other than his employer).
Next, in the context of evaluating damages for lost profit(s), the
court discussed case law requiring a company to show that its
business had been injured, interrupted, or destroyed.85 After such
a showing, "the measure of damages is the diminution in value of
the business by reason of the wrongful act, measured by the loss
of the usual profits from the business."86 With this background,
the court considered whether Cook had caused Mario to lose con-
tracts before his last day of employment with Mario. Specifically,
Mario alleged that Cook's failure to perform according to the re-
quirements of his job in quoting figures on jobs that he was nego-
tiating on behalf of Mario before he left Mario-but after he had
decided to develop his competing business-resulted in Mario's
later failure to obtain those jobs.87 The court concluded that be-
cause Cook had not performed according to his job obligations on
two contracts that he was negotiating before leaving Mario, there
82. Id. at 453-44, 650 S.E.2d at 695.
83. Id., 650 S.E.2d at 695-96.
84. Id. at 454, 650 S.E.2d at 695-95 (citing Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 92,
472 S.E.2d 263, 270 (1996)).
85. See id. at 455, 650 S.E.2d at 696 (citing Saks Fifth Ave., Inc. v. James, Ltd., 272
Va. 177, 188, 630 S.E.2d 304, 311 (2006)).
86. Id. (quoting Saks, 272 Va. at 188, 630 S.E.2d at 311).
87. Id. at 457-58, 650 S.E.2d at 697-98.
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was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the contract
losses were damages caused by Cook to Mario.88
Finally, the court addressed the issue of punitive damages.
Specifically, the court supported the trial court's use of a jury in-
struction that defined "actual malice" as "a sinister or corrupt
motive such as hatred, personal spite, ill will, or a desire to injure
the plaintiff."89 Where Cook had formed a competing company
while he was still employed at Mario, and where he admitted that
he intended to compete with Mario, a jury "could have concluded
and did conclude that Cook had the requisite malice to injure Ma-
rio."90 The trial court's failure to set aside a punitive damages
award, therefore, was not error.9 1
Not all business torts appear in unlawful competition cases,
however. In a case that considered the threshold factual showing
for a prima facie case of tortious interference with a contract, the
Norfolk City Circuit Court analyzed the claim of an employee who
contended tortious interference led to her forced resignation. 92 In
Wilson v. Modjadidi, the plaintiff, a dental assistant, sued a dent-
ist with whom she worked, claiming that he tortiously interfered
with her contractual relationship with her employer, the dental
practice. 93 The defendant dentist filed a demurrer alleging that
the plaintiff did not state a cause of action for tortious interfe-
rence with her employment contract. 94
The court first noted that to state a claim for tortious interfe-
rence with her employment contract, the plaintiff was required to
allege intentional interference with the contract by the use of im-
proper methods by the defendant dentist. 95 An allegation of im-
proper methods is required where the underlying contract is ter-
minable at will. 96 The court explained that improper methods
could be demonstrated where the defendant violated a law;
threatened, intimidated, bribed, defamed, or breached a fiduciary
relationship; or engaged in some conduct that violated an "estab-
88. Id. at 457, 458, 650 S.E.2d at 697, 698.
89. Id. at 460, 650 S.E.2d at 699.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Wilson v. Modjadidi, 74 Va. Cir. 279, 279, 282 (Cir. Ct. 2007) (Norfolk City).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 280.
95. Id. at 281-82.
96. Id.
[Vol. 43:211
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
lished standard of a trade or profession," such as conduct that
would be unethical under the standards of the profession. 97
The Wilson plaintiff alleged that the defendant dentist had
used improper methods to interfere with her employment con-
tract where he "stated his intention to compel [her] to" resign.9 8
For example, the plaintiff alleged that the dentist told her, "You
are next," after another employee quit due to the dentist's wrong-
ful conduct. 99 The plaintiff also alleged that after her resignation,
the dentist "openly bragged about his having caused [her] to lose
employment."oo The court found that these facts were sufficient
to show improper methods, and accordingly sufficient for the
plaintiff to state a prima facie case of tortious interference with
her employment contract.101 She had alleged that the dentist had
"intended to force her to resign and actually made specific threats
of those intentions."10 2
Tortious interference claims generally arise where the business
damage is experienced by a company.1 03 Wilson demonstrates the
somewhat creative use of this tort to state a claim in a personal
employment context, in addition to providing an example of a
prima facie showing in such a context.
V. SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In Virginia legislative activity, Virginia Code section 2.2-4311.1
was amended to add a provision requiring that all public bodies
provide in each written contract with a state contractor that the
contractor does not, and will not during performance of the con-
97. Id. at 282 (quoting Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 227-28, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836-37
(1987)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Simbeck, Inc. v. Dodd-Sisk Whitlock Corp., 44 Va. Cir. 54, 57 (Cir. Ct.
1997) (Winchester City) ("It is important to note that [tortious interference] is an economic
tort designed to punish both unlawful and sharp competitive business practices, and it
generally arises ... where one wrongfully expropriates a business opportunity for himself
or improperly intervenes in another's business relationships to expand his own business."
(emphasis added)).
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tract, "knowingly employ an unauthorized alien as defined in the
Federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986."104
The Unemployment Compensation Act of Virginia was
amended to provide that the Commissioner of the Virginia Em-
ployment Commission may recoup overpayments of benefits.105
Such overpayments may be "recorded, enforced, and satisfied as
orders or decrees of a circuit court upon certification" by the
Commissioner of the Virginia Employment Commission.106
A Virginia Senate bill allowing employers to pay employees by
credit or a prepaid debit card or card account was carried over to
the 2009 session.107
Although there was no change during the 2008 General As-
sembly session to Virginia's statute setting its minimum wage at
the rate set by the Fair Labor Standards Act, the federal mini-
mum wage did change, thereby impacting virtually all Virginia
employers. The Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 provided for
phased increases in the federal minimum wage.lOS The federal
minimum wage rose from $5.15 per hour to $5.85 per hour for
work performed from July 24, 2007 to July 23, 2008.109 As of July
24, 2008, and continuing to July 23, 2009, the federal minimum
wage will be $6.55 per hour.110 Work performed on or after July
24, 2009 must be compensated at the minimum wage of $7.25 per
hour.111
VI. CONCLUSION
No specific Virginia legislation or case of the past year appears
to have significantly modified existing patterns in Virginia labor
and employment law, although the change to the federal mini-
mum wage has had and will continue to have a significant prac-
tical impact on most Virginia employers. In general, Virginia
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4311.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-633 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
106. Id.
107. See S.B. 223, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
108. See Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, tit. VIII, § 8102(a), 121
Stat. 188, 188 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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courts have continued to address the recurring issues of Virgin-
ia's core employment claims: exceptions to the employment-at-
will doctrine; the family of business torts available to those in-
volved in employment contracts; and the contours of the non-
compete landscape.

